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Financial contagion reloaded:  
the case of Cyprus 
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Abstract 
In the present case study, our main objective is to bring to the forefront the main factors 
that led to the double-dip recession of the Cypriot economy. We analyze determinants such as 
“tax haven” status, interlinks with the Greek economy, spillovers originating in the Euro Area 
as a whole (through the debt crisis) and Greece in particular. In spite of the fiscal reform of 2002 
and the new fiscal system in force since the 1
st
 of January 2003, Cyprus continued to be a “tax 
haven”. Its high investment attractiveness spurred the “Cyp-Rus” relations, boosted an outsized 
banking sector (representing 800% of Cyprus GDP in 2010-2011) and generated an 
unsustainable proportion between the real and the “virtual” economy. Besides, the public sector 
became larger than required by such a small economy, its share in the total yearly value added 
being close to one quarter. Taking into consideration all these factors, we conclude that the 
„W”-shaped recession of the Cypriot economy is a sui generis one and the questioning of its 
“fiscal paradise” status is even more acute than in the case of countries such as Luxembourg or 
Liechtenstein.  
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1. Introduction 
Cyprus, a member of the euro zone since 2008 and a high income non-OECD 
economy (according to the World Bank classification), recorded a robust economic growth 
during 1975-2008. The insular country is considered “unique” in the EU, taking into account  
several cumulative evidences: its geostrategic position (at the intersection of three continents), 
its status of “tax haven”, its division in two parts (one Greek, the other Turkish) since 1974, 
the UN peacekeeping force and the British military presences on the island. As demonstrated 
in our analysis, “unique” in the euro zone are as well the Cypriot crisis and the “bail-in” 
rescue package.  
The reason for having chosen the present topic is, on the one hand, its actuality, and, 
on the other hand, the absence from the literature of a comprehensive analysis of the 
determinants that led to the Cyprus crisis. The existing papers examine either its tax haven 
status (Maftei, 2013) or the deep relationship with Russia through the capital flows (Pelto et 
al., 2004), or the EU accession (Tocci, 2004) or institutional aspects (for instance its banking 
sector, Stephanou, 2011, or the territorial partition between Greece and Turkey, Tocci, 2004). 
Drawing on data provided by institutions such as Eurostat, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and European Commission and experts’ opinions, we analyze in our case study 
Cyprus main macroeconomic indicators and explain the key factors that led to the double-dip 
recession of the Cypriot economy. 
 
2. The „W”-shaped recession of the Cypriot economy mirrored by 
macroeconomic indicators 
Before it became a member of the euro zone in January 2008, the Republic of Cyprus 
presented “impeccable credentials” (The Economist, 2012). In 2007, it ran a budget surplus of 
3.5% of GDP and a government debt of 59% of GDP (IMF, 2013).  
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In 2009, as a direct consequence of the global financial and economic crisis (spread 
through channels such as decline in external demand, investment decrease, increasing 
difficulty in accessing credit for the already highly indebted private sector), the Cypriot 
economy slipped into its first recession in 35 years.  
After two years of modest growth, the economy entered a double-dip recession in 
2012 (Chart 1), having as source the spillovers originating in the euro zone as a whole and 
Greece in particular.
2
  
 
Chart 1: Cyprus GDP real growth rates during 1980-2012 (in %) 
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                                        Source: IMF (2013). 
 
Starting with 2009, the general government balance was negative, and the government 
gross debt deepened. At the level of 2012, the IMF data indicated a fiscal deficit of 5% of 
GDP and a public debt of over 86% of GDP (Chart 2).    
 
Chart 2: Cyprus – General government balance and public debt during  
1995-2012 (% of PIB) 
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                                          Source: IMF (2013). 
 
At the same time, the private sector debt (including here the households and 
companies from the non-financial sector) continued its ascending trend and is close to 300% 
of GDP – the third highest in the EU (The Economist, 2013; Eurostat, 2012) (Chart 3).  
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Chart 3: Private sector debt in the EU countries in 2011 and in Cyprus  
during 2001-2011 (% of GDP) 
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Source: Eurostat (2012).  
 
The recession brought as a direct consequence a sharp increase of the unemployment 
rate in Cyprus, which surpassed in 2012 the level of 12% - higher than the euro zone and EU-
27 averages (European Commission, 2013) (Chart 4). 
 
Chart 4: Unemployment rate in Cyprus during 1982-2012  
(% of the active population) 
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Source: IMF (2013). 
 
These macroeconomic indicators alone do not explain why Cyprus entered the double-
dip recession in 2012, which forced the authorities to resort to the burdening “bail-in” 
package. Factors such as the status of Cyprus as a “low tax haven” (Maftei, 2013, p. 44) and 
its attractiveness for the Russian capital, its banks exposure to sovereign Greek debt, the 
spillover effects of the global financial and economic crisis as well as of the euro zone debt 
crisis on the Cypriot economy are just several determinants of its actual economic situation.  
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3.  Main “acts” of the Cyprus “drama”  
Year 2011 may be considered decisive for the Cypriot economic situation, due to a 
complex of factors. It was the first time after the EU accession when its internal weaknesses 
became visible, as the economic downturn of 2009 had been considered mainly a direct 
consequence of the global financial and economic crisis. The Cypriot banks exposure to 
sovereign Greek debt proved to be too high and the pace of the structural and fiscal reforms 
too slow. The austerity measures adopted in 2011 were not the solution to the crisis and the 
protests against the austerity intensified. More than that, in July 11, 2011, the Vassilikos 
power plant (the largest one in Cyprus) was extensively damaged by a blast at the Cyprus 
Naval Base. Besides the restoration costs (estimated at Euro 300-350 million), a direct effect 
was the increase of the energy prices, already situated at levels above the EU average (Cyprus 
Mail, 2012).  
The rating agencies Moody’s, Fitch and Standard&Poor’s played again their role by 
the means of downgrading government bond ratings and banks credit ratings. In September 
2011, the Cyprus access to the international bond market was practically blocked by 
prohibitive bond yields (Financial Times 2011).  
The moment that prefigured Cyprus’ “fate” was the euro zone Summit of 26-27 
October 2011 in Brussels, when it was decided that the Greece debt would be reduced by 
circa Euro 100 billion, by the means of a “voluntary” 50% haircut in the nominal value of the 
Greek bonds. This decision had successive repercussions on the Cypriot banking sector. At 
the level of 2011, Laiki Bank (Cyprus Popular Bank) lost Euro 2.5 billion (Reuters, 2013d), 
and the Bank of Cyprus over Euro 1 billion (The New York Times 2012), as a consequence of 
the financial contagion transmitted through the channel of the Greek bonds (EUObserver 
2012). In the Annual Report of 2011, the Central Bank of Cyprus emphasized that “Cypriot 
banks with operations in Greece are particularly exposed to credit risk due to the adverse 
economic conditions and the increased uncertainty that exists.” 
In December 2011, Cyprus managed to obtain a loan from the Russian Federation, 
amounting to Euro 2.5 billion, with a five year maturity and an interest rate of 4.5%. Cyprus 
has been for a long time an offshore centre preferred by the Russian “big business” (Reuters, 
2013c). It is worth underlining that, in spite of the fiscal reform of 2002 and the new fiscal 
system in force since the 1
st
 of January 2003 – considered necessary for the EU membership 
of 1
st
 of May 2004 –, Cyprus continued to be a “tax haven”. Among the factors that 
guaranteed this position were: low levels of income taxes and VAT and the absence of a 
rigorous capital control. At the same time, the foreign investors outside the EU (especially 
from the Russian Federation) were attracted by the possibility of acquiring Cypriot citizenship 
(therefore EU status), which stimulated the “Cyp-Rus” relationship (Pelto et al., 2004). 
 
Table 1: VAT levels in Cyprus since the adoption of the VAT legislation in 1992   
Date/period Standard rate Reduced rate 1  Reduced rate 2 
01/07/1992 - 30/09/1993 5% --- --- 
01/10/1993 - 30/06/2000 8% --- --- 
01/07/2000 - 30/06/2002 10% 5% --- 
01/07/2002 - 31/12/2002 13% 5% --- 
01/01/2003 - 31/07/2005 15% 5% --- 
01/08/2005 - 29/02/2012 15% 5% 8% 
01/03/2012 - 13/01/2013 17% 5% 8% 
14/01/2013 - 12/01/2014 18% 5% 8% 
Starting with 13/01/2014 19% 5% 9% 
Source: http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/vat/VAT.nsf/DMLrates_en/DMLrates_en?OpenDocument.  
 
 5 
 
 
Its high investment attractiveness boosted an outsized banking sector (with assets 
representing 800% of Cyprus GDP in 2010-2011) and generated an unsustainable proportion 
between the real and the “virtual” economy. Cyprus and other EU countries, like 
Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, France and Netherlands record also a 
value of bank assets as a percentage of GDP higher than the EU average of 370%. Outside the 
EU, “tax havens” like Switzerland and Liechtenstein register as well high bank assets-to-GDP 
ratios (European Banking Federation, 2012). Nevertheless, most of them have a highly 
diversified national economy and are export-oriented. For instance, in Liechtenstein, although 
the financial sector contributes to 27% to the GDP and generates more than one third of the 
state revenue, the manufacturing industry is the largest sector (Liechtenstein Bankers 
Association, 2012). Financial services contribution to the overall economy (measured by 
gross value added) is close to 27% in Liechtenstein – similar to Luxembourg – and much 
higher than in countries like Switzerland, UK, Ireland. Of the 17 banks licensed in 
Liechtenstein, seven are subsidiaries of solid Swiss and Austrian institutions (Liechtenstein 
Bankers Association, 2012). 
In Cyprus, the largest shares of the total gross value added in 2011 (at basic prices) 
were held by the following sectors: Distributive trades, transport, accommodation and food 
services (23%), Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work 
activities (22%), Real estate activities (almost 12%), Financial and insurance activities (9%) 
and Construction (8%) (Eurostat, 2013). This structure underscores not only the low 
contribution of the financial sector to the output, but also another weakness, given by an 
oversized public sector.  
Moreover, there are two other key factors that distinguish Cyprus from other countries 
with large banking systems. As indicated by Stephanou (2011), domestically-owned credit 
institutions (both cooperatives and commercial banks) play an important role in Cyprus. 
Besides, even though the biggest domestically-owned banks in Cyprus are small in absolute 
terms, their large size as a proportion of GDP sets them apart from those of other countries. 
The three biggest banks (Bank of Cyprus, Laiki, and Hellenic Bank) controlled 56% of 
domestic deposits and 48% of domestic loans as of March 2011 and expanded their operations 
abroad, particularly in Greece (Stephanou, 2011).  
In June 25, 2012, a week before his country assumed the rotating six-month 
presidency of the Council of the European Union, the Cypriot president announced the 
intention of resorting to international financial assistance. At that time, the government 
estimated the financial need at Euro 3-4 billion, while the EU experts had already advanced 
the amount of Euro 10 billion. 
Without any access to the international capital markets, Cyprus had been searching a 
second loan from the Russian government, in order to recapitalise Laiki Bank, its second-
largest bank after big losses caused by Greece’s debt restructuring in March 2012 (The 
Economist, 2012). 
In November 2012, the Cypriot authorities declared that the necessary amount to avoid 
collapse was at least Euro 17 billion, out of which 6.1 billion was required for the payment of 
the due external debts, and the rest for the banks recapitalisation (RiaNovosti 2013).  
One month later, it was outlined a draft memorandum of understanding between the 
Cypriot authorities and the troika of international lenders, made out of the European Central 
Bank, the European Commission and the IMF. The hard conditions attached to this 
memorandum (new austerity measures and taxes increase) hindered the reach of any 
agreement. As a consequence, the government was forced to resort to a loan amounting to 
Euro 250 million from the pension funds of the state-owned companies, in order to be able to 
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pay the holidays wages of the civil servants (Spiegel International 2012a and 2012b, 
EUObserver 2012, RiaNovosti 2013).  
Exactly nine months after the announcement made by the Cypriot authorities 
regarding the financial aid needed, on the 25
th
 of March 2013, the finance ministers of euro 
zone member countries reached an agreement with the Cypriot authorities on the key elements 
necessary for a future macroeconomic adjustment programme (Eurogroup Statement on 
Cyprus, 2013). 
This agreement (considered as “Plan B”), was concluded a week after the rejection by 
the Cypriot parliament of the initial proposal (“Plan A”, supposing a levy of 6.75% on 
deposits of less than 100,000 euros – the ceiling for European Union guaranteed deposits – 
and 9.9% on deposits above 100,000 euros, Bloomberg, 2013). Even the “Plan B” is 
considered “harsher” than the initial one (as it involves the shut down of Laiki Bank, the 
move of the guaranteed deposits from this bank to the Bank of Cyprus, while uninsured 
deposits face major losses), the Parliament could not vote against it, as this implies the 
restructuring of the banking sector, for which there is a legal framework already adopted. 
Anyway, this solution was based on the principle “take it or leave it”, as the European Central 
Bank had informed on its decision to cancel all forms of financing for Cyprus in the absence 
of an agreement until the 25
th
 of March 2013. 
Besides these two plans, the experts envisaged another one, having as main players 
Russia and Cyprus. Apparently, Cyprus is only a small insular country in the Mediterranean, 
but, in reality, its geostrategical position and resources are eyed by major players on the 
international stage. According to this scenario, the Russian banks would have taken over the 
Cypriot credit institutions, Gazprom would have assumed control over the newly discovered 
gas resources located offshore Cyprus (estimated at Euro 400 billion), and the Euro would 
have been replaced by the Russian Ruble. Nonetheless, this “Plan C” would have tensioned 
the relations between the Russian Federation and the EU and also would have had a negative 
impact on the Euro, with a share of 40% in Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. At the same 
time, the Cypriot Orthodox Church would have supported Cyprus’ exit from the euro zone, 
but probably not the costly alliance with Russia. This is a strong institution at national level 
and holds almost one third of the Hellenic Bank shares, the third “big bank” after Bank of 
Cyprus and former Laiki. One might conclude that, like in a chess game, Cyprus was 
sacrificed in order for Russia to obtain a better position. Besides, Latvia, as a future member 
of the euro zone, might replace Cyprus as an attractive destination for the Russian investors 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2013b; Der Spiegel, 2013).  
The agreement according to the “Plan B” is known as a “bail-in”, as the shareholders 
and bondholders in banks are forced to bear the costs of the restructuring first, followed by 
uninsured depositors (Reuters, 2013a).  
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Dutch minister of finance, president of the Eurogroup and 
president of the Board of Governors of the European Stability Mechanism, asserted that this 
solution chosen for Cyprus should be considered “a model for the rest of the euro zone”. 
Nevertheless, market reactions were negative, and many EU heads of government infirmed 
the “Dijsselbloem model”.  
Even if it has the lowest value among the countries that have already resorted to 
external financial aid (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain – GIPCS), the “bail-in” 
package represents circa 57% of its GDP (Euro 10 billion / Euro 17.5 billion), as compared to 
bailout packages of approximately: 67% for Greece, 54% for Ireland, almost 46% for Portugal 
and 9.5% for Spain (Chart 5). Taking into consideration this amount, we estimate that the 
general government gross debt will reach 146-160% of GDP at the level of 2013. According 
to the troika of international lenders, Cyprus will have to diminish this percentage to 100% of 
GDP until 2020 (Financial Times, 2013, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2013a). 
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Chart 5: Bailout/”bail-in” packages for Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain  
(% of nominal GDP and Euro billion, respectively) 
Bailout package / GDP at market 
prices (in %)
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Sources: Eurostat 2012a and 2012b. 
 
After the Cyprus “bank earthquake”, against the background of “capital flight” (even 
in the presence of strong rules on capital flows – Reuters, 2013b) and the loss of the statute of 
“tax haven”, of increasing unemployment rate and of higher risks of credit default, the 
European Commission presents a discouraging economic outlook for Cyprus: GDP decreases 
in real terms of 3.5% in 2013 and 1.3% in 2014 and gross fixed capital formation reductions 
of 23.7% in 2013 and 11.6% in 2014. Moreover, in April 2013 it changed the previous 
forecasts to GDP declines of 8.7% and 3.9%, respectively. Other experts predicts GDP drops 
of 15% in 2013, 15% in 2014 and 5% in 2015, generating a cumulative four-year decline in 
GDP of 33% and surpassing the six-year decline of Greece of circa 24%. Besides, a possible 
“labour exodus” could hurt the economy even more than the “capital flight” (The Economist, 
2013). 
 
4. Conclusions 
In the present paper, we underscored the main factors that led to the actual crisis 
of the Cypriot economy and the burdensome “bail-in” package.  
In 2009, the Cypriot economy slipped into its first recession in 35 years. The 
economic downturn of 2009 had been considered mainly a direct consequence of the 
global financial and economic crisis and only in 2011 Cyprus’ economic weaknesses 
became visible, for the first time after its EU accession. Among these weaknesses can be 
mentioned the following.  
First, its status of “tax haven” boosted an outsized banking sector (with assets 
representing 800% of Cyprus GDP in 2010-2011) and generated an unsustainable 
proportion between the real and the “virtual” economy. In contrast to other “tax 
havens”, like Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the Cypriot economy is not enough 
diversified. Moreover, a small number of domestically-owned credit institutions play an 
important role in Cyprus and they expanded their operations abroad, particularly in 
Greece.  
Second, the Cypriot banks exposure to sovereign Greek debt proved to be too 
high. The financial contagion transmitted through the channel of the Greek bonds and 
the associated losses had successive repercussions on the Cypriot banking sector and on 
the Cypriot economy as a whole. Third, the austerity measures adopted in 2011 were not 
the appropriate solution to the crisis and the protests against the austerity intensified. 
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Fourth, the oversized public sector chose a slow pace of the structural and fiscal 
reforms. In the near future, a possible “labour exodus” could hurt the economy even 
more than the “capital flight”. As a consequence, the „W”-shaped recession of the 
Cypriot economy is a sui generis one and the questioning of its “tax haven” status is even 
more acute than in the case of countries such as Liechtenstein.  
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